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A Correct Diagnosis of the Ills of Liability Insurance -
and a False Cure: a Comment on the Reports of the
Federal Tort Policy Working Group
Jeffrey O'Connell*
I. The Updated Report
In February of 1986, the Tort Policy Working Group of the United
States Department ofJustice published its report entitled "Report of the
Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent, and Policy Implica-
tions on the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability."'
The Report, in substance, found a crisis in tort liability insurance,
particularly in two areas, product liability and medical malpractice, lead-
ing to lack of availability and affordability of liability insurance. The Re-
port examined an exponential rise in litigation, especially in the two
crisis areas, and blamed the raging ills of the tort system on the uncer-
tainty of trying to predict: (1) when and (2) for how much would courts
impose liability for personal injury. In supporting this thesis, the Report
purported to document the rise of personal injury liability litigation in
the United States in recent years, especially in the two crisis areas. 2
The Report, in turn, was strongly contested by, for example, reports
emanating from the National Center for State Courts Study3 and the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General. 4 In general, such critics of the
Tort Policy Working Group purported to show that the crisis in the avail-
ability and affordability of personal injury liability insurance was not due
to rising litigation (which supposedly had remained relatively constant
over the years) but to: (a) the conspiratorial machinations of the insur-
ance industry trying to create an artificial crisis out of which would grow
"tort reform" denying accident victims their common law rights;
(b) attempts by the insurance industry to recoup, through higher prices,
amounts it had lost through a combination of its investment and under-
writing practices in a cycle when the industry wrote risks at prices that
were too low in order (hopefully) to reap a more than correspondingly
* John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A., 1951, Dartmouth College;
J.D., 1954, Harvard University. I am grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation at whose Bellagio Study
Center I was visiting scholar in June, 1987, where I wrote this manuscript. I am also grateful for the
helpful comments of my colleague at The University of Virginia Law School, Kenneth Abraham, on a
draft of this paper.
1 The Working Group consists of senior Reagan Administration officials of eleven federal agen-
cies, seven of whom are the chief legal officers of such agencies. (Hereafter cited as "1986 REPORT".)
2 Id. at 45-47.
3 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT,
1984 (1986). (Hereafter cited as "STATE COURTS.")
4 PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL INJURY LAwsUITs: A STUDY OF REALITY VERSUS
MYTH; AND ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILrrY, AND UNAF-
FORDABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE (1986) (prepared for the National Association of Attorneys
General by a task force headed by a former Attorney General of Massachusetts, Francis X. Bellotti)
(hereafter cited as "PUBLIC CITIZEN.") See also the final paragraph in note 8, infra.
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higher return on investments from the resulting cash flow of premium
dollars. A subsequent drop in investment income, it was argued, then
left insurers short in paying for the losses they had agreed to cover at
premiums that, as an underwriting matter, were too low and
(c) inadequate regulation of insurance, which had been wrongly dele-
gated to the states by the McCarran-Ferguson Act 5 despite the manifestly
interstate nature of the insurance.
Next, in a surrebuttal published under the title An Update on the Lia-
bility Crisis,6 the Tort Policy Working Group undertook to answer its crit-
ics and update the story of personal injury liability insurance in the
United States.
This latest report is a very able - if ultimately flawed - effort. 7
With a lucid and imaginative command of complex data, the Report ar-
guably succeeds in confirming both the fact and causes of the tort liability
crisis according to its 1986 thesis, while corollarially answering its critics
and their opposing thesis. In an impressive compilation and command
of daunting empirical data, the 1987 Report seeks and seems to demon-
strate convincingly that the difficulties plaguing personal injury liability
insurance especially for product liability and medical malpractice are
caused by the uncertainties in establishing projected claim frequency and
average claim cost.
In connection with its attempt to prove that the tort liability crisis is
caused by uncertainty as to the imposition of tort liability and not by
conspiratorial 8 investment or regulatory factors, the Report makes the
point that:
empirical testing can only disprove hypotheses: If the implications of
a particular hypothesis are inconsistent with the data, the hypothesis
can be rejected, but since any given set of data may be consistent with
the implications of a number of hypotheses, a particular hypothesis
can never be empirically proven. 9
5 Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982)).
6 AN UPDATE ON THE TORT LIABILITY CRISIS: TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, March, 1987
(hereafter cited as "UPDATE.").
7 For another lucid - and even more consistently sound - analysis of the insurance crisis, see
Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 399 (1987).
8 Some thirty consumer groups, for example, formed an association called The Coalition for
Consumer Justice to oppose tort reform being proposed by the insurance industry and its institu-
tional insureds. The coalition's president, Joan Claybrook, a colleague of Ralph Nader, stated that
the purpose was to "counteract a nationwide lobbying campaign by the insurance industry to limit
the legal limits of innocent consumers and victims." NATIONAL UNDERWRITER (Prop. & Cas. ed.)
March 14, 1986, at 4. According to Jay Angoff, an official of the National Insurance Consumer
Organization, another Nader group, in testimony before a U.S. Senate committee, "Our organiza-
tion thinks that the reason for the shortage of insurance is that the insurance companies have been
mismanaged in the past." N.Y. Times, March 2, 1986, at 20, col. 6. According to Robert Hunter,
head of the National Insurance Consumer Organization, (speaking of the insurance industry), "At
the top of the cycle [they] write [policies for] everybody, no matter how bad, and at the bottom [they]
cancel everybody no matter how good. It's a manic-depressive cycle," TIME, March 24, 1986, at 25.
Ralph Nader himself saw an attempt at a mini-reversal of the American Revolution in the machina-
tions of Lloyds of London whom he accused of trying to force the United States to reduce accident
victims' rights under American common law. As Nader put it, "the London insurance market is
acting like 'King Lloyd', reviving memories of that earlier British tyrant, King George." J.
O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME 109 (1986).
9 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 17 n.25.
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It seems best, therefore, to take up the Report's attempt to disprove cer-
tain theses and then to move to the Report's attempt to support other
theses.
A. Collusion
As the Report puts it, "[ilt has been asserted that a principal cause of
the crisis has been concerted, anticompetitive actions by insurers to raise
prices in certain lines of property-casualty insurance or even to refuse to
write such insurance."' 1 According to critics of the insurance industry,
the purpose of such collusion is: (a) to be able to raise prices and (b) to
be able to convince legislatures that tort reform restricting the rights of
injured parties is necessitated by the crisis created by rising prices."'
However, the Report argues that collusion seems an unlikely cause of the
insurance crises, given: (1) the large number of insurance companies,
(2) the relative ease of insurers in quickly and easily acquiring "the neces-
sary licenses and expertise to either begin selling their existing lines of
insurance in new states or to provide new lines in the states in which they
are already licensed," 12 (3) the additional relative ease of institutional
insureds (such as manufacturers or medical societies) substituting self in-
surance for buying insurance from insurance 'companies' 3 and (4) the
lack of market concentration in property-casualty insurance. 14
10 Id., app. at 1.
11 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12 UPDATE, supra note 6, app. at 8.
13 Id, at 6.
14 The Report uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which is "an index of market con-
centration calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of all the firms in the market. It
varies from near 0 (extremely unconcentrated) to 10,000 (total monopoly). [The higher the HHI],
the smaller the number of firms and the more unequal their market shares." Id-, app. at 9, n. 17.
The highest HHI for [a]ll [p]roperty-[c]asualty was 229 in 1985. Even if [m]edical
[m]alpractice and [o]ther [l]iability [including product liability] were valid antitrust markets
and competitors [were] limited to just current sellers of those lines, their highest HHI's
would be 663 and 278. These are low HHI values. The 1984 Department ofJustice Merger
Guidelines, for example, indicate that mergers raising the HHI to a level under 1,000 are
not a cause of competitive concern. These low levels of market concentration imply that
successful collusion among property-casualty insurers is highly unlikely, even in the ab-
sence of any legal prohibitions.
Finally, even if collusion were likely in this unconcentrated market because . . . [of
antitrust immunity under either the McCarran-Ferguson Act or state law], there are several
reasons why the current availability-affordability problems cannot be blamed on collusion.
First, the antitrust immunities have applied to all lines of insurance since at least 1945, with
de facto immunity since the 1869 decision of the Supreme Court in Paul v. Virginia, [75
U.S. (8 Wall) 168 (1869)] while the crisis is of relatively recent origin and is occurring in
only a few lines. Second, collusion cannot explain unavailability: firms do not collusively
raise prices above costs and then refuse to sell the product. Third, collusion as an explana-
tion for the large price increases observed in recent years is directly contradicted empiri-
cally by both the fall observed over that period in the ratio of premiums to underwriting
costs ... and by indications of significant underperformance by property-casualty firms in
recent years in the stock market ....
Id., app. at 9-10.
Concerning these allegations of conspiracy, the report of the New York Governor's Advisory
Commission on Liability Insurance states as follows:
First, we want to make clear that we have found no signs of any form of insurance
industry "conspiracy" of the kind that has been alleged in some quarters. We have encoun-
tered no evidence that there was a collectively arrived at decision to manipulate or abandonthe market. Had there been such a decision, the corollary presumption would be that insur-
19881
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B. Imprudent Insurance Company Business Practices and
Declining Investment Income
The Updated Report outlines the hypothesis that imprudent busi-
ness practices have caused the insurance crisis stating:
[L]ower initial premiums could be made up by the higher investment
income that could be earned on those premiums between the time
they were collected and then they would be required to pay ... for...
covered losses. Insurers would be able - and in a competitive market,
would be forced - to lower their rates. In this scenario, falling inter-
est rates in 1985 and 1986 resulted in an unanticipated decline in in-
vestment income. Insurers facing large anticipated casualty losses
found themselves with investment income insufficient to cover these
losses, and were forced to turn to their only remaining source of funds
- current policy-holders - whose premiums escalated rapidly. In
sum, it is theorized that the additional income from recent, very sub-
stantial premium increases has been sought by insurers to compensate
for unexpected declines in investment income. Theoretical analysis
suggests that if property-casualty insurance markets are competitive -
and the concentration data presented above support that assumption
- it would not be possible for insurers to recover sunken losses due to
ers would have played a different role in the development and handling of this crisis. Given
that it is impossible to prove a negative, we cannot, of course, totally rule out the possibility
that such a conspiracy might have been developed, or that some firm somewhere may have
attempted to engage in some form of collusion or market manipulation. Establishing abso-
lute certainty in such a matter is not a task that this Commission is equipped to undertake.
We simply conclude that we have discovered no evidence that would warrant an assertion
that a conspiracy occurred, and that there are strong theoretical and practical reasons to
suggest that it did not.
Contemporary economic theory holds that in an industry of this kind, with a highly
fragmented structure, a lack of significant market share concentration, and an absence of
high barriers to entry, an effective conspiracy is highly doubtful at best. The potential for
price leadership phenomena or other forms of oligopolistic behavior in an industry as splin-
tered and competitive as this one is virtually nonexistent, so that an effective conspiracy
would be difficult if not impossible to pull off. Indeed, the aggressive and ultimately exces-
sive and destabilizing price of competition of the early 1980's is testimony to the extraordi-
nary competitiveness of the industry and its difficulty in achieving any discipline in the
marketplace. And, on the affirmative side of the coin, we have neither turned up any evi-
dence that would suggest collusive behavior, nor can we find evidence that the actual course
of events has benefitted any particular firm or faction in the industry.
While we have carried on no inquiry that employed subpoena power or other such
investigatory devices, we can report that it is neither suggested by our research, nor does it
strike us as fundamentally plausible, that the actions of some willful cabal have placed a
major role in the development or prolongation of the crisis. The industry has been effective
in using the crisis to promote changes in the tort law. But this does not constitute evidence
of a conspiracy to manipulate the market. And, more fundamentally, it does not affect the
forces that produced the crisis or the merits of the issue of what should not be done about
it.
We observe in passing that the medical malpractice insurance experience of the last
decade reinforces our view of the implausibility of the conspiracy thesis. During the nation-
wide crisis that struck that line in 1974-75, there were also charges of insurer conspiracy.
The solution proposed was to form a doctor-owned mutual insurance company that would
replace the alleged conspirators with consumerinsurers who would have no incentive to
conspire. In fact, of course, although the doctor-owned company has almost half the medi-
cal malpractice market, the behavior of that market with respect to insurance rates, availa-
bility and affordability in the years since has been if anything more objectionable to the
insureds than has been true in commercial insurance lines.
11 GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE, STATE OF NEW YORK, INSURING OUR
FUTURE 66-67 (1986) [hereinafter "GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMM'N."].
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past pricing mistakes by charging higher, super-competitive premiums
to current policyholders, especially if new insurers, not suffering from
previous errors could profitably undercut the inflated premiums of the
old insurers.15
The Report examines three types of state intervention: (1) regula-
tion of prices (to see to it that the consumer is not overcharged); (2) reg-
ulation of quality (to see to it that the insurers remain financially stable
and solvent), and (3) regulation of risk pools (so as to widen them in
order to in effect redistribute wealth). 16 As to price regulation, the Re-
port states that despite considerable research on the effects of regulation
on the prices charged by property-casualty insurers, no consensus has
emerged as to whether regulation has raised prices or not. Studies going
both ways are cited.17 As to regulation of quality and the size of risk
pools, while the Report concedes a possible effect on insurance costs, it
concludes:
... for all three types of state regulation, while significant research on
their effects in the specific crisis lines is lacking, timing alone suggests
the lack of a significant, or at least exclusive, connection. In the mid
1970s there was a crisis in medical malpractice insurance .... The
1980s brought another crisis in Medical Malpractice, as well as in sev-
eral other lines of property-casualty insurance. If regulation were to
blame for these crises, one would expect to find that regulation in-
creased during or slightly before each crisis and slackened at other
times. This, however, does not appear to have been the case. The lack
of any apparent correlation between changes in regulation and the de-
velopment of a resolution of availability-affordability problems in par-
ticular states indicates that state regulation is not directly to blame for
the current crisis.' 8
15 UPDATE, supra n.6, app. at 10-11.
16 Regulatory requirements that insurers must provide, or otherwise help pay for, coverage for
inner city residents or those with AIDS are examples of expanded risk pools.
17 Id., app. at 12-13.
18 Id., app. at 16. As to the argument by consumer advocates and trial lawyers for more regula-
tion of insurance as a solution to the ills of tort law, note that New York State has traditionally had
far and away the best insurance regulation in the United States. Granted the presence of other
variables, it is at least worth noting that New York has been as much-or more-plagued by the tort
liability crisis compared to other states (as documented by the working group). UPDATE, supra note 6
at 92-96. Professor Spencer Kimball of the University of Chicago Law School, long the country's
leading authority on insurance regulation, does not believe that switching to Federal regulation by
repealing the McCarran-Ferguson Act will improve the situation. At least insurance regulation, he
argues, has a ranking priority in the states as the only major industry subject principally to state, and
not federal regulation, whereas it would be just another chore added to a long list of regulated
industries for the federal government (already in the midst of a worldwide trend of deregulating
what it has responsibility for). (For a crisp journalistic summary of that trend, see N.Y. Times, July
19, 1987 at 3, col. 1.) Admittedly, Kimball has characterized the "typical [state] insurance code as
rubbish heap without parallel in the law-making of modern man." Kimball, Introduction:Unfinished
Business in Insurance Regulation, 1969 Wisc. L. REV. 1019 (1969). But these days even liberals may be
inclined to doubt that regulations from Washington or Albany (not to mention Santa Fe) can price
insurance better than insurance executives can. Recently, the New York Governor's Advisory Com-
mission on Liability Insurance recommended what it termed maxi-minimum price regulation, pur-
porting to limit wide fluctuations in insurance prices to counteract notorious and recurrent
underwriting cycles. GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 14, at 93-98. But for a perceptive
attack on such proposals as unworkable, see Stewart, One Vote Against Flex-Band Rating, NATIONAL UN-
DERWRrrER (Prop. & Cas. ed.) Feb. 9, 1987, at 12, cols. 1-3. There are, says Stewart, too many
"pricing points" for regulators, with or without flex-rating, ever to effectively control prices. Those
19881
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C. Insurance Pricing
Before turning to the Report's attempt to ascribe the crisis in tort
liability insurance to uncertainty as to projected claim frequency and av-
erage claim cost, it may be helpful to refer to another lucid and convinc-
ing study analyzing the degree to which the insurance industry can be
blamed for irresponsible pricing of tort liability insurance, especially in
the crisis lines. Trial lawyers, consumer advocates, legislators and insur-
ance commissioners can purport to demonstrate that insurers are
overcharging for insurance at any given point, by variously estimating:
(1) future claim frequency and average claim costs; (2) what returns the
insurer can expect to earn on premiums collected, pending payment of
claims and (3) what the availability of reinsurance will be, etc. The New
York State Governor's Advisory Commission on liability insurance com-
menting on how an insurer estimates an appropriate premium stated:
Until an insurer knows what its actual costs for paying claims in the
future are, it must estimate them. It does so by using its experience to
establish reserves to cover what it predicts that unpaid or unreported,
and the costs involved in adjusting those losses will be .... Compli-
cated actuarial arguments can be and are advanced as to whether a
given insurer's predictions are reasonable. But there is never any
question that they either are or can be anything more than estimates,
nor is it asserted that critics or regulators can argue for anything
firmer than alternative estimates. The truth cannot be known with cer-
tainty until the years have passed and the actual claims have been filed
and paid.
Indeed, the actual level of payments can be greatly influenced by
events that occur between the policy year and the point that a claim
arises. 19 The interpretation of liability law can change, rampant price
inflation can alter the cost of medical treatment, policy language can
be construed in the light of new circumstances, or many other influen-
tial factors can intervene to change the cost complications of a given
volume of coverage outstanding ....
[W]hen all is said and done, the actual costs attributable to
underwriting are not only unknown but unknowable with precision.
Where controversy has arisen, the choice is between estimates, not be-
tween facts. This does not make the argument any less heated, but it
establishes the outer bounds of ambition in this matter .... [N]obody
can know what it will turn up a decade or more from now that actual
underwriting costs have been.. .. 20
The New York Report correctly indicates that neither insurers nor
"those looking over their shoulders" 2' can know whose estimates are
pricing points can come in the form of coverages, deductibles, experience rating, dividends, financ-
ing arrangements, underwriting criteria, etc.
19 The above is true for "occurrence" policies which cover liability for events taking place during
the policy period, irrespective of when a claim arising from an event is filed. Although most policies
written are still of the occurrence type, some are now written on a "claims made" basis, meaning the
policies cover liability for claims filed during the policy period irrespective of when the event took
place. Obviously under a claims made policy, the time lag between collection of the premium and
payment of a claim is greatly shortened. For a discussion of "claims made", see K. ABRAHAM, Dis-
TRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 50-51, 58, 113, 210 (1986).
20 GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 14, at 55-56.
21 Id. at 60.
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right. And in that situation, it behooves those of us looking over the
shoulders of those who are actually betting their own money on the esti-
mates to be wary of insisting that our estimates be substituted for theirs.
D. Tort Liability as the Cause
This gets us to the variable of appraising future average claim cost
and claim frequency as the underlying cause of the tort liability crisis.
Granted once again the point that empirical testing cannot prove hypoth-
eses, but only disprove them,22 the Working Group nevertheless pur-
ports to confirm that the crisis in tort liability insurance has been due to
uncertainty surrounding when and how such liability is to be imposed -
especially for medical malpractice and products liability.
According to the Report, citing figures from Rand Corporation's In-
stitute of Civil Justice, there has been "an extraordinary growth" in civil
jury awards recently, especially in the crisis areas of medical malpractice
and products liability. As an example, the average medical malpractice
jury award in Cook County, Illinois increased, in inflation-adjusted dol-
lars, from $52,000 in 1960-1964 to $1,179,000 in 1980-1984, with San
Francisco having a corresponding increase from $125,000 to $1,162,000.
Product liability awards showed a similar "extraordinary increase."'23
Along with increasing average jury awards, plaintiffs have also greatly in-
creased the percentage of cases they win which go to trial. In product
liability cases in Cook County and malpractice cases in both Cook County
and San Francisco, plaintiffs have approximately doubled the percentage
of cases tried which they win in front ofjuries from roughly one-fourth in
1960-64 to one-half in 1980-84.24 ,
The Report takes special note of the further and especially signifi-
cant increase in million dollar jury awards. The Institute of Civil Justice
data indicates that 65% of the total dollar amount awarded by juries in
all personal injury cases in Cook County were awarded in verdicts of a
million dollars or more, and yet the million dollar cases represented only
2.8 percent of all plaintiff's personal injury jury verdicts.25
22 UPDATE, supra note 6, app. at 17 n. 25.
23 Id. at 33.
24 Id. at 34.
25 Id. at 37, citing M. PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980s, TRENDS: INJURY TRIALS AND VER-
DICTS IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 37 (1987). The Report notes that critics of the
Working Group's 1986 Report raised objections to the Report's use of average (or mean) rather than
median jury verdicts to show the extraordinary growth injury awards with the concomitant effect on
jury availability and affordability. The average jury award is derived by dividing the total number of
such awards, whereas the median award is the dollar level at which half the awards are at or below
and the other half at or above. Thus assuming three awards - for $50,000, $150,000 and
$1,000,000 - the average award would be $400,000 whereas their median would be $150,000.
Those criticizing the Working Group's Report argue that using the median jury award fails to
demonstrate a substantial change in verdicts over the past twenty years. It is their contention that
average jury awards, by including a small number of "high end" verdicts, distort the picture. Id. at
39. In reply to that, the Report states:
An insurer calculating its premiums or a self insurer setting aside liability reserves is inter-
ested in obtaining as accurate a projection as possible of its total liability. If it were to use
projected median awards and settlements, it would most likely vastly underestimate its total
liability since such data do not reflect the small number of "high end" settlements and
awards that account for a large percentage for its likely total payout. On the other hand, an
19881
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The Report also notes the rise in verdicts for pain and suffering. It
points to data estimating that an average of 80% of entire awards involv-
ing more than $100,000 in noneconomic damages is for the
noneconomic component of the damages. The Report further notes esti-
mates that from 28 to 50 percent of all amounts paid in medical malprac-
tice damages is attributable to noneconomic damage awards in excess of
$100,000.26
The Report further notes the threatening rise of punitive damages.
While admitting that punitive damages are infrequent, the Report con-
cludes they are not as rare as often supposed. 27 Beyond this, the Re-
port's assertions on punitive damage, while plausible, unlike much of the
Report are not supported by empirical evidence. According to the Re-
port, plaintiffs' lawyers have little, if anything, to lose by claiming puni-
tive damages. 28 The Report further notes that claims for punitive
damages, bottomed on claims of defendants' egregious conduct, contrib-
ute to the acrimony of the litigation, thus lessening reasonable settle-
ment negotiations. 29 Furthermore, the Report argues, the imposition of
punitive damages can be so random and fortuitous that, even if they are
reversed or diminished on dppeal, they arguably further contribute to the
inability of insurers to assess their likely exposure to risk.30
As to the study by the National Center for State Courts purporting
to challenge the rising amount of tort liability litigation, the Update's
main point is that the Working Group's earlier Report focused on crisis
areas - namely product liability and medical malpractice, but also in-
cluding such coverages as municipal liability. Because the State Courts'
study provided no separate data for such areas, but instead cumulated
those claims along with all other tort claims (including auto cases), the
accurate projection of the average award or settlement would allow the insurer or self in-
surer to determine its actual exposure if it could also accurately project the number of
settlements and awards it would have to pay.
A simple example illustrates the point. Let us assume that an insurer projects that it
will have to pay four claims on a particular policy - that three of those payments will be in
the range of$100,000, but that at least one payment will be for a million dollars. If it were
to use the median payment ($100,000) to calculate its premiums, the insurer would only
collect sufficient premiums to cover a total payout of $400,000 (4 x $100,000). If its projec-
tions proved correct, it would lose $900,000 on the policy. On the other hand, if it based its
premiums on the average payment ($325,000), the insurer would collect sufficient premi-
ums to cover the projected payout of$1,300,000 (4 X $325,000). Assuming its projections
proved correct, the insurer would break even.
Simply put, those who must pay the liability generated by the tort system cannot afford
the luxury of using data which effectively ignore the cases which result in the largest
payouts. Accordingly, it is virtually impossible to understand the effect (or even to appreci-
ate the existence) of rapidly increasing settlements and awards on the availability and af-
fordability of insurance if one relies on median data.
UPDATE, supra note 6, at 40.
26 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 38, n. 31.
27 According to the Report, nearly one out of every eight (12%) of the plaintiffs' product liability
verdicts in San Francisco handed down in 1980 and 1984 included an award of punitive damages.
Id. at 49.
28 As one British judge put it, "gross negligence is ordinary negligence with a vituperative
epithet," Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., [1866] L.R. 1 C.P. 600, 603 (and plaintiffs' lawyers
in framing pleadings find vituperative epithets very easy to come by).
29 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 49-50.
30 Id. at 50-51.
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Center's conclusion that there was no overall "litigation explosion" does
not really address such areas as products liability and medical malprac-
tice. Indeed, even a small reduction in auto accident cases (attributable
to enactments of no-fault auto insurance) 31 would more than mask a
large increase in products and medical cases. 32
The Report also notes that critics of its February, 1986 Report have
questioned the Report's use of data from federal district courts in that
federal data represents only a small percentage of all trial tort claims and
are in other ways unrepresentative. The Report states:
In the absence of meaningful data on case filings in State court in areas
such as product liability and medical malpractice, the Federal District
Court data compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts provide the most accurate data on the growth in filed cases.
While federal cases represent only a fraction of all tort cases in either
of these categories, there is no reason to believe that they do not accu-
rately reflect what is happening in the State courts. 33
Finally in its criticism of the tort system, the Report points out how
inscrutable are recurring attempts to apply tort liability standards to par-
ticular cases - focusing, as an example, on repeated and frustrating at-
tempts by the courts to define such variables as the cost-benefit ratio
involved in determining whether a product is "defective." The Report
further focuses on the case of O'Brien v. Muskin Corp,34 a product liability
case concerning an above-ground swimming pool with an inner vinyl
liner. The manufacturer had attached a warning on the side of the pool
reading, "DO NOT DIVE." Nevertheless, the plaintiff (found to be a
trespasser) dove in the pool, filled to a depth of about 3 1/2 feet, and
sustained a serious injury. His claim for liability was based on a failure to
adequately warn him of the risks of diving and the use of the pool's vinyl
liner. Although the trial court allowed the failure to warn claim to go to
the jury, it disallowed the design claim based on the use of the vinyl liner
on the grounds that even the plaintiff's expert witness had to admit that
he knew of no alternative liner materials for above-ground pools.3 5 The
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision as to the
defective design claim based on the fact that even though the plaintiff
could not show a wiser alternative design, he could win in a product lia-
bility suit if he could convince the jury that "the risk posed by the pool
outweighed its utility."3 6 Commenting that the O'Brien case illustrates
the degree to which unpredictable imposition of tort liability relates to
the unavailability and unaffordability of liability insurance, the Report
31 According to Raymond Stahl, Senior Vice President of the Traveler's Insurance Co.: "There
has been a substantial change in our 'mix' of lawsuits. Ten years ago, automobile injury suits were
two-thirds of our inventory. Thanks to no-fault insurance laws, today auto suits are only half of what
they were." Mulholland, Industry Problems Causing Unnecessary Legal Expenses, NATIONAL UNDERWRrrERS
(Prop & Cas. Ins. ed.), June 6, 1981, at 8, cols. 3-4.
32 Up'ntT:, supra note 6, at 44.
33 Id. at 46.
34 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
35 Id. at 301.
36 Id. at 306. But see NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1987), enacted after O'Brien and provid-
ing manufacturers with a possible defense against liability if there was no feasible alternative design.
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states, "[i]ncreasingly, insurers and potential defendants find it ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict liability." 37 In effect, the
Report seems to argue, although the tort liability system is supposed to
detect and discourage unreasonable behavior, providers of goods and
services increasingly find the legal system lacking the capacity to be
reasonable.
II. The Report's Flaws
If the Update is (and confirms that the earlier Report was) right in
key aspects of the diagnosis of the ills plaguing personal injury liability
insurance as stemming from uncertainty concerning projected average
claim cost and claim frequency, it is nonetheless wrong (as was the earlier
Report) on proposed cures. The Report discusses in considerable detail
the implementation of the various reforms which the original task force
recommended including: (1) elimination of joint and several liability;38
(2) limitations on noneconomic damages; 39 (3) modification of the collat-
eral source rule;40 (4) use of periodic payments for future damages;4 1
(5) limitations upon attorneys' contingency fees42 and (6) changes in reg-
ulation of the insurance industry. 43 The Report goes on to indicate the
frustrations felt by many at the ineffeciency of tort reforms enacted by
the many states. 44 The Report further recommends specific statutory
language to refine and correct often inadequate reforms on these scores
enacted by state legislatures. 45
A. A "Return to "Fault"?
In essence, the Report says, given time, these reforms will probably
have some effect. It takes comfort in the experience in California where
medical malpractice reform has slowed the increase in malpractice pre-
miums compared to New York and Florida, both states which have not
enacted similarly stringent medical malpractice reform.
46
However, the point is that merely slowing the rate of insurance in-
creases (even assuming the California experience is all that encouraging)
is not what society should be striving for. The Working Group's original
1986 report listed as the first of the eight reforms for tort change, "[re-
turning] to a fault-based standard for liability" and "[basing] causation
findings on credible scientific and medical evidence and opinions."
'47
But the law on the books already requires fault. Proving a product
defective is very similar in the typical case to proving the product negli-
37 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 58.
38 Id. at 68.
39 Id. at 69-70.
40 Id. at 70-71.
41 Id. at 71-72.
42 Id. at 72.
43 Id. at 73-74.
44 Id. at 75.
45 Id. at 78-87.
46 Id. at 93-94.
47 Id. at 88, citing the Working Group Report, 1986 REPORT, supra note 1, at 60.
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gently manufactured. 48 That strict liability for products, even in ex-
tremely liberal instances of application as in the O'Brien case,49 is not the
key part of the problem for tort liability is illustrated by the fact that the
problems plaguing medical malpractice insurance - governed by negli-
gence not strict liability standards - are equal to or greater than those
plaguing product liability. Further, courts in every state endorse black
letter law requiring that causation findings be based, in the words of the
Working Group's recommendation, "on credible scientific and medical
evidence and opinions." Although the Tort Policy Working Group un-
dertakes statutory language as to all its other recommendations, neither
in its first or updated report does it undertake to draft language to imple-
ment its two principal recommendations: to return to a fault criterion
and to require credible scientific evidence. That in effect acknowledges
that the problem of tort liability is not the language of the criteria impos-
ing liability. Rather it is that the language itself (whether the term in
question is "defect," "contributory negligence," "assumption of risk,"
etc.) is by definition protean, subject to myriad meanings as applied in
infinitely varied fact situations. Abuses in law rage not only in liberal
states like New Jersey but in conservative states like Virginia, which has
not even adopted comparative negligence, not to speak of the admittedly
more extreme (but still only marginally important) interpretations of
"defect" exemplified by O'Brien. The expansion of tort law is not due, as
the Working Group would have it, to some conspiracy of trial judges and
compliant juries, manipulated by skillful plaintiff's lawyers. Rather it is
due to the fact that people who are genuinely injured (or at least who can
be plausibly made to seem so by skillful counsel) are presented to jurors
with often plausible theories of defendant's product or conduct being
somehow at fault under inherently vague criteria. These criteria are de-
finable much more precisely than we lawyers now define them (whether
by common law, Restatements, legislation, regulation, whatever) so long
as a fault criterion - narrowly or broadly defined - is retained. 50
B. The Pressure to Compensate Losses
Ironically, although the Working Group does not note it, the expan-
sion in personal injury liability occurs whether society ismore or less
affluent. The more affluent we are the more jurors are inclined to view
with sympathy the few of us consigned to misery by an accident (as long
as a plausible case of protean tort liability can be made), but the less
affluent we are (as in West Virginia, for example) the more juries seem
inclined to redistribute liability insurance dollars to alleviate at least iso-
lated instances of misery.51 Ironically, too, the Reagan Administration
arguably adds to the problem by opposing the expansion of social legis-
48 Cf. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974);J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT
LOrrERY 176-82 (1979); P. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S LJ. 30, 38
(1973).
49 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
50 J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME, 123-24 (1986); see also supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text.
51 See R. NEELEY, WHEN BUSINESS COLLIDES WITH THE COURTS 91-92, 139-44, 147-49 (1986).
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lation thereby adding to the temptation ofjudges and jurors to distribute
income to the needy by the only means available to them, namely tort
liability. However, adding to networks of social and private insurance
will arguably only exacerbate tort liability insurance ills by financing fur-
ther and more aggressive tort litigation by those insulated from dire need
by such expanded nontort insurance (coupled with hiring a lawyer on a
contingent fee) - and therefore no longer induced to settle for lower
and quicker amounts. 52 This seems to have been the experience under
no-fault auto insurance as it sometimes seems to serve to subsidize and
thereby expand the tort liability it was designed to replace. 53 Even
stronger evidence on this score is provided by the exponential rise of
third-party liability suits by recipients of workers' compensation. Thus
almost half of all product liability payments (42%) are made to recipients
of workers' compensation, already the beneficiaries of our most compre-
hensive and generous scheme of social insurance. 54 Nor will expanded
social insurance necessarily lessen the appeal of injured victims to im-
pressionable jurors. Although medical expenses may thereby be more
likely to be covered, no one expects that middle class wage loss will be
covered by social insurance in the indefinite future, and it is wage loss
that comprises the biggest bulk of economic loss of serious injury
cases.
55
Also, the effect of the kinds of incremental reforms advocated by
Working Group for lowering premiums is arguable at best. One Califor-
52 On the relative payouts from all forms of insurance, including social and private health and
disability as well as liability insurance, see O'Connell & Baker, Compensation for Injury and Illness: An
Update of the Conard - Morgan Study, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 913 (1987); O'Connell & Guinivan, An Irrational
Combination: The Relative Expansion of Liabilty Insurance and Contraction of Loss Insurance (forthcoming).
53 O'Connell &Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice BetweenFault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV.
61, 72 (1986). But see U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-
Up REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 113-18 (1985), indicating that reduced
caseloads for the courts under no-fault insurance are due not only to thresholds banning smaller
suits but to the fact that for many payment of economic losses by no-fault makes "a lawsuit unneces-
sary." Id. at 116. Apparently some are induced to litigate more aggressively because of no-fault and
some to litigate not at all. In all likelihood those with bigger losses will be in the former category.
O'Connell &Joost, supra this note. See infra note 54.
54 INSURANCES SERVICES OFFICE (ISO), PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 63 (1977) [hereafter cited as "ISO PRODUCT STUDY"]. That it is larger
losses that lead to aggressive pursuit of tort claims, 4ided by no-fault 'subsidies', is indicated by the
fact that the product liability claimants with work related injuries, although receiving 42% of total
payment, constituted only I I% of product liability claimants for personal injury. The average prod-
uct liability payment made for work-related injury was $97,884, as opposed to an overall average of
$24,752. Id. at 60. See also O'Connell, Transferring Injured Victims, Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurers, 1977
U. ILL. L.F. 749, 766 n.63.
55 The consistency of the mix of medical versus wage loss in various types of cases has been
striking: For medical malpractice cases, 70.8% of injury losses have been wage loss, 27.1% medical
loss and 2.1% other expenses. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, REPORT OF THE ALL-INDUSTRY COMMIT-
TEE, SPECIAL MALPRACTICE REVIEW: 1974 CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY
RESULTS 54 (1976). For product liability cases, 72.0% of injury losses have been wage loss, 22.5%
medical loss, and 5.5% other expenses, ISO PRODUCT STUDY, supra note 54, at 45, 48. These figures
closely match those for serious automobile accidents of 741% of injury losses for wage loss, 22% for
medical loss, and 4% for other losses. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH
LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 6 (1971); the auto figures were computed using the losses listed in Table 2 for Medical
Expense, Wage Loss and Other Expenses. As to paid claims (as opposed to losses) for medical
malpractice the General Accounting Office recently reported as follows:
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nia medical malpractice defense lawyer cited the following as an example
of the frustrations accompanying recent tort reform:
I supported the tort reforms in California, limiting pain and suf-
fering damages and contingent fees, plus deducting collateral sources,
etc. But one effect has been, in my view, an increase in defense costs.
It works this way: every serious injury tends to find a legal home, i.e. a
lawyer. But in the old days, the big case was more likely to go to an
experienced attorney who knew how to appraise both the liability and
damages. He also knew how to pursue the case, including how to take
depositions, etc. Now, with the limits under the tort reform legisla-
tion, many cases are turned away by the better plaintiffs' lawyers who
cannot afford to try to handle marginal cases in view of the lesser value
that tort reform has imparted to those cases, both in the form of dam-
ages and plaintiff's counsel fees. So those cases end up in the hands of
second, third, and fourth tier lawyers who know little of how to ap-
praise or handle such a case, endlessly complicating the process from
the point of view of defense counsel, including the matter of deposi-
tions, negotiations, and practically every other phase of the case. Who
would have thought it?5 6
C. Beyond Availability and Affordability of Insurance
But even if the reforms make liability insurance somewhat more
available and affordable, the key problems of tort liability for personal
injury are not - and never have been - availability and affordability. It
is difficult to determine whether we spend too much on personal injury
compensation in the United States. The famous California Medical Asso-
ciation study indicated that tort liability pays an almost infinitesimally
Table 3.5: Total and Average Amount of Patient Economic Losses by Categories
"Amount" in millions
Economic Losses'
Categories Amount Percent Average Highest
All claims $4,531.3 100.0 $113,227 $10,463,000
Medical expenses
Incurred as of claim closing 282.3 6.2 7,055 560,000
Anticipated future 919.2 20.3 22,968 4,000,000
Wage Loss
Incurred as of claim 163.6 3.6 4,078 1,000,000
closing
Anticipated future 1,526.2 33.7 38,137 3,000,000
Otherb
Incurred as
of claim closing 87.4 1.9 2,184 1,400,000
Anticipated future 1,552.6 34.3 38,796 9,999,999
Only represents claims for which data were provided and, therefore, are representative of about
half of the universe of claims.
" Other expenses include such items as housekeeping services, vocational rehabilitation, travel,
and home renovation. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 44 (1987).
56 Personal oral communication to the author.
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small number of those injured in hospitals.5 7 (If that report is to be be-
lieved, the tort system is the health care provider's best friend, shielding
it from massive exposure to liability for losses inflicted by it.) Moreover,
the same is arguably true of products liability.58 However, the key
problems of tort liability are not so much the number of dollars we
spend, but what we do with them. Any way one looks at it - whether the
sums are too big or too small - they are large and they are being wildly
wasted under tort law.59 Many injured parties are not paid at all, many
are paid far more than their actual losses; for everyone huge delays are
the norm and the percentage going to lawyers and expert witnesses are,
as the report itself indicates, staggering. 60 In this connection, though, it
is curious to see the Reagan Administration, of all people, advocating
wage controls, as they do for plaintiff's personal injury lawyers. 6' Given
all the uncertainty and complexity of establishing tort liability (repeatedly
referred to and documented by the Tort Policy Working Group in both
its reports) and the possible riches involved in personal injury litigation
(also documented) who is to say that plaintiffs' lawyers are overpaid, ver-
sus, say, defense lawyers, surgeons, rock singers, investment bankers,
athletes, etc?
The worst combination of any social arrangement is waste coupled
with want. But that is the essence of the personal injury tort system, with
so many injured parties either not paid, underpaid, or overpaid and with
so much payment channeled into transaction costs.
Nor of course is that terrible combination of waste and want limited
to the crisis areas of medical malpractice and product liability insurance.
Since these cases are the most complex, the situation is worse there, as
the Updated Report - and especially its imaginative Appendix - lucidly
help to demonstrate. The waste and want pervading the tort system are
inherently the function of an insured event that is so uncertain, entailing
determinations of fault and the value of pain and suffering, two variables
not present in any other form of insurance at least to any significant ex-
tent.62 It is true that disability insurance pays small scheduled amounts,
57 CAL. MEDICAL ASS'N AND CAL. Hosp. ASS'N REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY
STUDY (D. Mills ed. 1977).
58 NAT'L COMM'N ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 74 (1970);J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT
TO INJURY 18 (1975).
59 Many observers--especially those with a "Law & Economics" bent, point to the redeeming
merit of tort law in aiming at optimal deterrence of unsafe activities. See, e.g., W. LANDES & R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw (1987). But see supra note 37 and accompanying
text. For more on deterrence, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
60 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 52-53.
61 Id. at 86-87.
62 J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME 123-25 (1986). If, one might ask, the criteria of
fault and pain and suffering are the keys to the unmanageability of tort liability insurance, why do
auto liability rates show much less volatility than rates for medical malpractice and products liability?
UPDATE, supra note 6, app. Table 4. There are two explanations. First, auto insurance is spread over
millions of rather uniform driving risks, whereas health care providers and product manufacturers
are (relatively) few and much less homogeneous than drivers, with concomitant difficulty in spread-
ing huge risks over a few and varied insureds. Secondly, auto insurance is often sold with relatively
low limits (the required minimum in most states is $10,000 or $20,000 per person, with many motor-
ists buying minimum or no more than twice the minimum and very few carrying $1 million or more
in coverage). This means far less exposure for insurers to relatively large numbers of big "outrider"
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e.g. $5,000, for defined injuries such as amputation, but to the extent
workers' compensation entails substantial payment of scheduled benefits
for a broad range of losses beyond medical expense and wage loss, it
takes on the difficulties of tort liability. 63
The problem with all the reforms proposed by the Working Group's
1986 Report and its Update is that little is proposed to change that situa-
tion. By not only retaining, but insisting on a revitalized fault criteria,
the need for lawyers on both sides to battle over issues of fault remains.
Of course, one can purport to cut these costs by arbitrarily limiting what
the lawyers on one side can be paid, but if one hasn't changed the nature
of their tasks, justice is not served. If one were to make it much less
necessary to hire lawyers (as no-fault auto insurance and workers' com-
pensation do) then there is justification for cutting attorneys' fees. In-
deed, under no-fault auto, it seems to happen automatically, with less
need for lawyers and less for them to do when they are needed.6 4 But
note that all the changes proposed by the Working Group in its initial
and updated Reports either make it harder for injury victims to be paid
(with a corresponding decrease in their attorneys' fees) or pays them less
after they meet more restrictive tort criteria.
In this connection, the Working Group's initial and updated Reports
speak of the present evolving tort regime as moving toward a no-fault
system. 65 To the extent they mean that plaintiffs can recover under re-
cent tort law more easily than in earlier days, there is something to it.
But to imply that the tort system has become a grand and easy giveaway
is dead wrong. One must keep in mind that recovery in tort for personal
injury is still, after all the recent changes cited by the Working Group, a
very difficult task, facing years of effort and huge chances of disappoint-
ment. As noted earlier, the Updated Report itself cites figures indicating
that defendants win approximately one-half of the cases going to a jury
verdict. 66 That is scarcely a no-fault system. Moreover, the failure rate
in court has a manifestly depressing effect on chances for - and the
amounts of - settlements without going to court.
The Updated Report asserts:
verdicts against deep pockets, the phenomenon which drives so much of the raging medical malprac-
tice and product liability insurance systems. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Thirdly, auto accidents happen in certain, limited, physical ways, compared to more exotic prod-
uct and medical injuries, and in addition have been the subject of claims and litigation for so long
that there are fewer underwriting surprises compared to the newer, more complex coverages in-
volved in the crisis lines. Even so, the Updated Report is at pains to confirm the general inadequacy
of personal injury liability insurance beyond crisis areas. Note for example its discussion condemn-
ing high transaction costs, including those for all personal injury liability insurance. UPDATE, supra
note 6, at 52-53. Note too the opening sentence of the closing paragraph of the Appendix to the
Updated Report: "The overall pattern in the data is thus one of high and increasing cost ratios for
underwriting losses and adjustment expenses, especially in [but not limited to] the crisis lines ......
Id., app. at 22.
63 O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of
Claimants 'Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 342-44 [hereafter cited as Abolish Payment for Pain];
M. BERKOWITZ &J. BURTON, PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION (1987).
64 J. O'CONNELL, THE LAwsurr LoTTERY 171-72 (1979).
65 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 53-55.
66 Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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A limitation on noneconomic damages . . . , if properly formulated,
probably is the single most effective legislative reform of tort law. Not
only does such a limitation significantly reduce the costs of the tort
system, but it also serves to expedite settlements by eliminating an un-
known which undermines the ability of the parties to reach agreement
on compensable damages. Such a limitation also mitigates the unfair-
ness of the tort system for many plaintiffs and defendants arising from
the fact that widely different damages often are awarded for nearly
identical injuries. 67
This paragraph graphically illustrates the myopia of the Working
Group's recommendations. Take the last sentence first. According to
the Group, the way to mitigate the unfairness of discrepancy of results
between claimants is to cut every claimant down to a low level, even
those whom jurors believe ought to be paid more. Or take the statement
that eliminating payment of pain and suffering would expedite settle-
ments for economic ("compensable") damages. Elsewhere, the Working
Group states that its recommended limits on pain and suffering will not
hinder the collection of damages for economic loss. 68 But that is simply
not so. Lessening the exposure of defendants to large verdicts for
noneconomic losses lessens the incentives of defendants to pay for eco-
nomic losses. If an insurer thinks it may be forced to pay a verdict that
includes $1,000,000 in noneconomic damages, it is much more likely to
settle for a plaintiff's $500,000 medical expenses and wage loss than if it
knows pain and suffering damages are limited to, say $200,000. Perhaps
payment for pain and suffering is too high today. We cannot say as a
matter of certainty. (That's the key problem of compensating in dollars
for non-dollar losses.) But we should be under no illusion that putting a
limit thereon does not affect other damages as well.
III. A More Promising Cure
A. True No-Fault Across the Board?
Past reforms of tort law that have made the greatest difference have
involved a trade: under workers' compensation and no-fault auto insur-
ance, the injured parties may get less for loss, but at least they are as-
sured of that less. Thus under workers' compensation and no-fault auto
insurance, in return for giving up claims for pain and suffering, the in-
jured parties are paid for much of their economic loss irrespective of
fault of either payor or payee. This, in turn, eliminates the two variables
that make personal injury tort law so unworkable - determining fault
and the economic value of noneconomic loss. 69
Admittedly the solution of workers' compensation and auto no-fault
is not readily adaptable to other lines of insurance such as product liabil-
ity, medical malpractice or other forms of liability. If one goes into an
auto accident in reasonably good shape and comes out with a terrible
67 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 79.
68 1986 REPORT, supra note 1, at 66-69.
69 Concerning the experience of no-fault auto insurance laws, and the means whereby they can
even more live up to their promise, see generally O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists A Choice Between
Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REv. 61 (1986).
[Vol. 63:161
ILLS OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
gash on one's forehead, or even with an arm severed, we know it was the
automobile accident that caused the gash or the amputation. But instead
assume one goes to a health care provider for treatment. The law cannot
decree that the health care provider will automatically pay for any ad-
verse condition becoming evident after the treatment. Some adverse
conditions may be due not to the treatment but to the initial complaint.
No matter what the doctor did perhaps the patient was going to get
worse. So separating the adverse conditions due to the treatment from
those due to the initial complaint is most vexing, on a fault or a no-fault
basis.
So in turn mandating that every health care provider be liable for all
adverse results occurring after medical service under a no-fault criterion
forces any health care provider to face unknowable claims and costs. So
too for product injuries. The law can hardly require that anybody who
produced or sold or even possesses a product pay for any injuries to
third persons resulting from that product without similarly creating un-
knowable new claims and costs.
B. Incentives to Make - And Accept - Prompt Payment for Economic Losses
But even so there are available means of beginning to achieve the
effects of workers' compensation and auto no-fault by paying injury vic-
tims promptly for their economic loss, without endlessly litigating fault
and the value of pain and suffering. Consider this proposal: A defendant
in a personal injury suit is given powerful incentives to promptly offer to
pay an injury victim's economic losses above his collateral sources, peri-
odically as they accrue (plus an hourly fee for the plaintiff's lawyer). If
the defendant does not do so, he loses defenses based on claimant's
fault, and must pay a winning plaintiff's lawyer's contingent fee in addi-
tion to the award itself.70 But if he does make such an offer, and the
plaintiff refuses to accept it, the plaintiff must then prove his case of fault
by both a heightened standard (1) of care (gross or wanton conduct) and
(2) of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt, or at least by clear and convinc-
ing evidence), with both the losing plaintiff and his lawyer jointly liable
for defendant's counsel fees.7 1 That way still relatively expensive liability
insurance will be reserved for paying losses not met by other more effi-
cient insurance sources (such as health and disability coverages) in a
manner similar to all other insurance devices (payable promptly and peri-
odically for economic - not noneconomic - loss), except in cases of
egregious conduct when a claimant is willing to take risks to get vindica-
70 For statutory language incorporating these ideas, as well as rationalizations for them, in an
earlier version of these proposals, see O'Connell, Abolish Payment for Pain, supra note 63, at 352-53;
O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Contributory and Comparative Fault, With Compensatory Savings by Also
Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 591, 598-600. For an ambitious proposal incor-
porating some of these ideas, see Sugarman, Serious Tort Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795, 819-40
(1987). For a further variant on combining an early offers' approach with expanding social and
private loss insurance, see O'Connell & Guinivan, supra note 52.
71 For further development of this proposal focusing on products liability but applicable to other
kinds of personal injury claims, see O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Reform, 48 OHIo
ST. L.J. 317, 318 (1987). For a further variant on combining an "early offers" approach with ex-
panding social and private loss insurance, see O'Connell & Guinivan, supra note 52.
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tion of harms not deemed adequately recompensed by normal insurance
means. An example of such egregious conduct would be an allegedly
drunken surgeon who has amputated the wrong limb of a white collar
worker, thereby causing loss far in excess of economic loss. 72
This way, too, whatever deterrence the tort system achieves remains
substantially in effect. 73 But in the typical case, tort law's incredible bulk
and weight can be used against it in a kind ofjujitsu maneuver to achieve
more rational insurance ends - by prompt, periodic payment of uncov-
ered economic loss, not, as the Working Group would have it, by contin-
ued and expensive fighting under a still cumbersome fault criterion to
pay some less and some more than normal insurance schemes pay in the
event of misfortune.
In sum, the Working Group got it half right. The tort system is too
cumbersome to function well as an insurance mechanism. But the solu-
tion is not to attempt to set the clock back to standards of fault of an
earlier day (when the tort system was still intolerable, combining waste
and want, if not as extensively and expensively as today) but to use the
tort system as a means of reallocating - not just lessening - the funds it
continues to use so badly with or without the Working Group's sug-
gested reforms.
72 Of course, a blue-collar worker - or anyone else - also would have the right to pursue a tort
claim if he or she wanted to risk it.
73 See supra note 59 and accompanying text for more on deterrence. See also Moore & O'Connell,
Forclosing Medial Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REv. 1267, 1285-86
(1984); O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 589, 618-20 (1982).
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